Александр (mr_aug) wrote,

VICTORY POINT про "Red Wings"

По наводке nortwolf_sam прекрасное - глава из книги VICTORY POINT про "Red Wings"
Много, достаточно подробно и с картами.
Меня вот это заворожило.

Крайне простая схема боя. Синей стрелкой - маршрут отступления SEAL, красными - огневой мешок моджахедов...
Интересные выдержки из документа:

1) Diligently gathered and processed intel revealed that Shah had up to twenty fighters with him.
Initial intel, prior to the launch of Red Wings, put Shah's force at up to twenty ACM. This intel came not from one source, nor one type of source, but from multiple, cross referenced sources. Furthermore, the small villages of the Korangal Valley / Sawtalo Sar / Shuryek Valley region--throughout the mountains of the Kunar, for that matter--cannot sustain numbers larger than twenty for very long; it is a logistical impossibility. The locals there can barely subsist, much less feed and house a small army.
2) The SEALs, who carried a relatively low power (5 Watt) PRC-148 radio attempted repeatedly to establish communication with combat operations centers, but couldn't effectively gain 'solid comms' due to the radio's low power exacerbated by the terrain. Major Tom Wood, 2/3's operations officer, personally ensured before the launch of the operation that the team had a number of 10-digit grid reference points (of pre-selected targets) in the area to call a precision artillery strike from a two-gun 105mm Howitzer battery at a Camp Wright, a forward operating base at Asadabad. However, without solid communication, no call-for-fire could be made. Weeks after the SEAL team ambush, during Operation Whalers, a Marine Scout / Sniper team was similarly ambushed on the slopes of Sawtalo Sar, not far from the site of the SEAL team ambush. The team leader, Sergeant Keith Eggers, called an artillery strike, and the ambush ended immediately with 105mm Howitzer rounds erupting on the enemy's positions.
3)  I should note that the SEAL team also carried an Iridium 9505A satellite phone as a backup to the 148. They were widely reported to have carried a cellular phone with them as backup, which is incorrect. A satellite phone is not a cell phone, and there was no cellular service at this very remote location in 2005.
4) The ambush against the SEALs was overwhelming, with Shah's team broken into three to four groups, each firing downward at the SEALs with AK47 fire, PK light machine gun fire (plunging, interlocking machine gun fire, a devastating method of attack), rocket propelled grenade fire, and possibly 82mm mortar fire.
5)  Shah and his men recovered virtually all of the SEAL reconnaissance and surveillance team's equipment, including 3 SOPMOD M4s (fitted with M203 40mm grenade launchers), rounds for the M4s and rounds for the grenade launchers, a Leupold sniper spotting scope, hand grenades, night vision goggles, four tactical helmets, a GPS, the intact PRC-148 radio, and among many other items, a computer with an intact hard drive that contained sensitive and classified information.
6) И снова о бое.
Regardless of number of men, Shah and his fighters had the SEALs surrounded (by up to 180 degrees), and fired at them from superior (higher elevation) positions with weapons of heavier caliber than the SEALs' .223 (5.56mm) caliber weapons. Shah himself fired at them with a PK medium machine gun, which fires a 7.62 x 54mm round. The PK is loosely comparable to the M240, the medium machine gun used by U.S. Marine infantry that fires a 7.62 x 51mm round (it replaced the M60 machine gun). Shah also had at least one RPG gunner, a number of men firing AK47s (7.62 x 39mm round), and possibly an 82mm mortar operator.
The only surviving member of the four-man team, Marcus Luttrell, wrote a brief (2 1/2 page) after action report. In it, he stated that he estimated that the reconnaissance and surveillance team was ambushed by 20 to 35 ACM.

After that first Afghan Math experience with the "Taliban commander" on the Icom, I gleaned a much better understanding of Afghan Math during Operation Pil, in late October, 2005. I was talking with one of the lieutenants at a patrol base a few miles east of Sawtalo Sar when I heard whizzing and cracking over my head, and then the crack-crack-crack of distant machine gun rounds unleashing what had already passed just feet above us. Rounds splintered branches and thudded into rocks. After the Marines took cover and quickly unleashed an overwhelming volley of return fire, I asked how many enemy had attacked us, thinking the number to be at least fifteen. The answer--from a seasoned Scout / Sniper team leader: Two. Two guys, each with a PK machine gun, at two locations, coordinating plunging, interlocking machine gun fire focused on our camp. Thankfully, this attack didn't injure or kill anyone, although there were some close calls.
The bottom line with respect to the four-man SEAL team is that they were vastly outgunned and out positioned, by an enemy that had excellent cover from the thick forest surrounding the Northeast Gulch, who knew the terrain well, and who coordinated a fierce combined arms attack utilizing a variety of powerful weapons systems (much more powerful than anything the SEALs had). Whether eight to ten or eight hundred to one thousand, it didn't matter. This was an overwhelmingly powerful ambush, especially given the RPG and PK fire, and the steep, narrow, funnel-like terrain.
Tags: afganistan, sof

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